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I. Introduction
For skeptics of mandatory corporate law, the right to sell is the most
important of the three investor rights. 1 The legal rights to vote and sue are
of limited effectiveness in the modern corporation, where the directors
control the proxy statement and are generally shielded from suit by the
business judgment rule. The self-help strategy of selling is a simple but
powerful way for the unhappy shareholder to protect himself when he
believes that the governance of a corporation is corrupt.
Indeed, the right to sell is arguably the defining characteristic of a public
corporation. Public shareholders can easily exit their investment by selling
their shares while private shareholders cannot. Public companies are thus

* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Thanks to Jaclyn Newell for excellent
research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Strougo v. Hollander, 111 A.3d 590, 595 n.21 (Del. Ch. 2015) (identifying
the “default powers of shareholders as three: the right to vote, the right to sell, and the right
to sue” (quoting WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 177 (2d ed. 2007)).
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subject to a different sort of regulation than private companies.2 Because
public shareholders can easily sell their shares, the market will check poor
corporate governance. As unhappy investors exit, the price of the
company’s stock will drop, making it easier for a new owner to purchase
control of the company. Henry Manne, who first recognized the
significance of this market for corporate control, thus declared that there
were “Two Corporation Systems,” with the economic incentives of
investors playing an equal role as the law in regulating the public
corporation. 3
Scholars who view corporate law through a law and economics lens thus
argue for less government regulation rather than more. In the context of
corporate governance debates, the right to sell has long supported the
argument that the ongoing judgment of a market of self-interested investors
is a better judge of good and bad governance than regulators and judges.4
Under this view, public companies are mainly public in the sense that they
are subject to monitoring by public markets. They are not public in the
sense that the government should shape them in a way that furthers the
public good. In the United States, public companies have thus been
regulated by a relatively limited set of federal securities laws, with the bulk
of corporate governance rules left to the states.
Over the last decade and a half, this framework has come under pressure.
The argument that public companies should be left relatively free from
corporate governance regulation has been challenged by the increasing
federalization of corporate law in the United States. Public companies,
especially large ones, are increasingly differentiated from private
companies through the regulatory requirements of federal law.5 The federal
securities laws have been amended through statutes such as the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”) 6 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
2. See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA.
L. REV. 259, 259 (1967) [hereinafter Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems].
3. See generally id.
4. The right to sell corresponds with the concept of Exit described by Albert
Hirschman as one of three ways a member can influence an organization. See ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: REPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND STATES 4 (1970). Hirschman observes that “exit” corresponds to “market” rather than
“non-market forces,” which correspond to the option of “voice.” Id. at 19.
5. For an analysis of this trend, see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson,
“Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337
(2013).
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.).
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), 7 which contain
mandates relating to corporate governance. Now, public companies are
being shaped by law rather than economics.
The heightened federal interest in corporate governance can be linked to
the limits of the right to sell.8 This Article focuses on describing two of
these limits. First, when there are serious corporate governance problems
that result in a precipitous decline in the company’s fortunes, shareholders
do not have time to exercise the right to sell. Investors thus are unable to
meaningfully pressure management for change and are unable to protect
themselves from substantial losses. The second limit relates to corporate
governance practices that may be suboptimal, but do not significantly
impact the economic value of the firm. Because shareholders will not sell
with respect to “immaterial” governance concerns, the right to sell is unable
to pressure managers to change.
The Article then shows how federal regulation of corporate governance
can be understood as addressing these two limits. The internal control
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley seek to prevent substantial destruction of
shareholder value caused by misappropriation or fraud by managers.
Executive compensation reforms—such as those found in Dodd-Frank—
were partly necessitated by the view that the market was unable or
unwilling to pressure the board to change compensation policy. In
particular, the Say-on-Pay reform is an attempt to increase shareholder
voice on executive compensation.
These interventions have blurred the distinction between corporate and
securities law. More and more, federal securities laws are imposing
mandatory requirements on public corporations. These regulations are
corporate law in that they are meant to protect shareholders from
destruction of value while they own a stock, rather than securities law that
protects investors when they purchase securities. As the limits of the right
to sell have become more apparent, federal corporate law is addressing
those limits.

7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
8. Another prominent explanation has been the general tendency of Congress to pass
governance measures in response to a stock market collapse. See, e.g., Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1779, 1782-83 (2011) (discussing passage of Dodd-Frank); Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521,
1528 (2005) (discussing passage of Sarbanes-Oxley).
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The Article concludes by evaluating these federal interventions under a
framework developed in a previous article.9 The danger of federal corporate
law is that it can impose mandatory rules that only benefit a subset of
shareholders. The question Congress should ask when making federal
corporate law is whether such efforts would clearly benefit almost all
shareholders. Applying this framework shows that there is a better case for
federal intervention to ensure the integrity of large public company
valuations than there is for federal executive compensation reform.
Shareholders have a strong interest in preventing precipitous destruction of
shareholder value, but shareholders may not agree on the need for particular
corporate governance provisions.
Part II of the Article briefly traces the intellectual history of the right to
sell in the context of corporate law. Part III then describes two major
limitations on the right to sell and how aspects of recent federal legislation
are best understood as responses to these limitations. Part IV assesses these
federal reforms. Part V concludes the Article.
II. The Right to Sell and Corporate Law
This Part II traces the origins of the right to sell in the corporate law
literature. Two prominent law and economics scholars, Henry Manne and
Ralph Winter, discussed the right to sell in challenging two influential
arguments. The first was that agency costs within the corporation make it
likely that managers will exploit shareholders, necessitating protection
through corporate law. The second was that federal intervention is
necessary to remedy the laxity of state corporate law.
Writing in 1959, Harvard Law Professor Abram Chayes was one of the
first legal scholars to note the role of the right to sell in protecting
shareholders.10 Commenting on efforts to promote shareholder democracy
to check corporate power, Chayes argued that increasing shareholder voice
would be ineffective in regulating the power of significant public
corporations. 11 Unlike other stakeholders, shareholders are free to sell their
shares, and thus are able to protect themselves from poor corporate decision
making. Because of this ability to disassociate from the corporation,

9. James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law,
64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 137-43 (2017).
10. Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 40 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959).
11. Id. at 40 (“It is unreal, however, to rely on the shareholder constituency to keep
corporate power responsible by the exercise of the franchise.”).
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shareholders are no more entitled to a voice than groups such as workers
that cannot exit the corporation. 12
Citing aspects of Chayes’s work a few years later, Henry Manne
challenged the famous Berle and Means theory. 13 Under their agency costs
framework, corporate law is necessary to address the “separation of
ownership and control” that leaves managers unchecked in furthering their
interests at the expense of shareholders. 14 In discussing the issue of
corporate democracy, Manne noted that the right to sell provided an
alternative remedy for poor corporate governance. As more and more
unhappy shareholders sell their shares, the company’s stock price will
decline, making it easier for an outside investor to purchase enough shares
to gain control of the company. 15
This, of course, was Manne’s famous market for corporate control
argument, which he later elaborated on in a 1965 article, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control. 16 In that article, Manne described the role of
markets in policing the effectiveness of managers. 17 While state corporate
law does not actively judge management performance, the market for
control provides “some assurance of competitive efficiency among
corporate managers and thereby affords strong protection to the interests of
vast numbers of small, non-controlling shareholders.” 18 The market, rather
than the law, thus provides shareholders with protection from
mismanagement.

12. For a more recent argument that the right to sell undermines the shareholder
democracy analogy, see Usha Rodriguez, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and
Civic Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1398 (2006) (referring to “the power of
easy exit through the sale of their shares – that is, the power to leave their polity”).
13. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932).
14. Henry G. Manne, The “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM.
L. REV. 399, 418 (1962) [hereinafter Manne, The Modern Corporation].
15. Id. at 410-11. Adolf Berle responded to the right to sell argument, noting that
corporations do not always need to seek financing, thus the right to sell may not
meaningfully check managers. See generally Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the
Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1962). However, Berle did not directly address
Manne’s market for corporate control argument.
16. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965) [hereinafter Manne, Mergers and the Market].
17. Id. at 113.
18. Id.
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It is perhaps no accident that Manne’s work coincided with the
development of the efficient markets hypothesis by financial economists. 19
If stock prices reflect available information about the corporation and its
value, they should also reflect information about the governance of the
corporation. Manne’s work thus linked an emerging body of research to
debates among corporate law scholars about the nature and scope of public
company regulation.
Another important Manne article, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law
and Economics, further developed the implications of the right to sell for
corporate governance. 20 The article began by noting that corporate law
scholarship should distinguish between public corporations, which are
subject to market forces, and closely held corporations, which are not. An
advantage of the public corporation is “the investor’s freedom to dissociate
himself from a particular corporation if for any reason he becomes
dissatisfied with its management.” 21 “[T]he market allows discrete
decisions to be made by individual investors” to sell their shares rather than
requiring a collective decision to dissolve the corporation.22 According to
Manne, the right to sell is a more effective way of regulating management
than the legal method of the derivative suit, “which can be used only to
police the more blatant forms of wrongdoing.” 23 The operation of “market
forces” should “constrain managers in a far more significant fashion than
does the derivative suit.” 24
Building on Manne’s insights nearly a decade later, Ralph Winter
defended state regulation of corporate law against persistent arguments for
federal incorporation.25 Prominent commentators such as William Cary, a
former SEC Chairman and Columbia Law School professor, had criticized
state corporate law, particularly the law of Delaware, as failing to
adequately protect shareholders from managers. 26 For Cary, federalism in
corporate law leads to a “race for the bottom,” where states will cut back on
19. Eugene Fama’s article The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices was published in 1965,
the same year as Manne’s Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control. See Eugene F.
Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965).
20. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems, supra note 2.
21. Id. at 264.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 273.
24. Id.
25. Ralph K. Winter Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
26. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
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shareholder protections to influence managers to choose their jurisdiction
when forming a corporation. Winter noted that these criticisms implied that
the stock prices of Delaware corporations would be lower than corporations
formed in other states because Delaware shareholders would sell their
shares if they were not protected from corporate mismanagement relative to
other states. 27 It would not be “in the interest of Delaware corporate
management or the Delaware treasury for corporations chartered there to be
at a disadvantage in raising debt or equity capital relative to corporations
chartered in other states.” 28 Citing Manne, Winter also noted that a
corporation whose shareholders are selling their shares would be vulnerable
to a hostile takeover that would replace its management. 29 Because of the
shareholder’s right to sell, the “chartering decision . . . so far as the capital
market is concerned, will favor those states which offer the optimal yield to
both shareholders and management.” 30
The next generation of corporate law scholars empirically tested
Winter’s hypothesis that Delaware had an incentive to create law that
would dissuade shareholders from valuing the company less because of
poor corporate governance. An event study by Roberta Romano showed
that corporations moving to Delaware did not suffer a statistically
significant negative stock price reaction. 31 In discussing Delaware’s
incentive to maximize shareholder wealth, Romano discussed the right to
sell, explaining:
Stockholders are expected to sell their shares if their firm is in a
jurisdiction with inferior (non-value-maximizing) laws, in order
to invest in the more valuable firms located in states with more
favorable legislation. These transactions will cause the stock
price of the business incorporated under the inefficient legal
regime to decline. . . . As a result, the corporation may be the

27. Winter, supra note 25, at 256.
28. Id. at 257.
29. Id. at 266.
30. Id. at 275.
31. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 226-73 (1985). A later study by Robert Daines found evidence that
the average Tobin’s Q, a measure of the market value of a firm, was higher for companies
incorporated in Delaware. See generally Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm
Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001). This Delaware effect, however, has not persisted. See
Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004).
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target of a takeover attempt, for new owners will be able to
increase firm value by changing the corporate domicile. 32
The right to sell is also relevant to modern corporate governance debates
about increasing shareholder power. For some time, shareholder rights were
seen as unimportant to large investors, who were apathetic about exercising
such rights because they could simply sell their shares. 33 Opponents of
increasing shareholder rights have cited the ability of shareholders to exit in
resisting significant changes to the balance of power between shareholders
and the board. As Stephen Bainbridge wrote in response to a proposal by
Lucian Bebchuk to increase shareholder power, 34 when “governance terms
are unfavorable, investors will discount the price they are willing to pay for
that firm’s securities. As a result, the firm’s cost of capital rises, leaving it,
inter alia, more vulnerable to bankruptcy or hostile takeover.” 35 According
to Bainbridge, shareholder power is thus unnecessary to protect most
shareholders and could result in disruptive activism that undermines the
power of the board to exercise centralized authority over the corporation on
behalf of all shareholders. 36 Bebchuk’s reply to Bainbridge noted that the
idea of a vibrant market for corporate control is no longer realistic given the
potency of takeover defenses such as the poison pill.37
Recently, John Morley and Quinn Curtis invoked the right to sell in
another context, the governance of mutual funds.38 Investors in an openended mutual fund are permitted to exchange their shares immediately for
32. Romano, supra note 31, at 229-30.
33. See, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Beating the Wall Street Rule with a Stick and a Carrot,
7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 251, 251 (1988) (“The Wall Street Rule, which has been immutable
for as long as any of us can remember, dictates that shareholders not take an active role in
corporate affairs.”).
34. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
35. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; see also
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 83, 122 (2004) (noting market constraints on management).
36. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 35, at 1744-51.
37. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1784, 1790 (2006) (“The market for corporate control thus leaves management with
considerable slack.”).
38. John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and
Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84 (2010). Morley also invokes
the right to sell in explaining why investors give managers significant control over
investment funds. See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of
Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014).
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cash. Their withdrawal represents a proportionate share of the value of the
assets held by the mutual fund. In contrast, investors who own stock
directly will find that their investment reflects the future prospects of the
firm, including the value destruction that may be caused by poor
governance. Although a shareholder must sell at a price discounted by the
possibility of mismanagement, the mutual fund shareholder can sell at a
price that does not reflect the future impact of poor fund governance.
Morley and Curtis are thus skeptical about the need for mutual fund
governance measures such as voting, boards, and excessive fee litigation.
They argue that the right of mutual fund investors to sell may mean that
such governance may be unnecessary and should be replaced by other
forms of regulation.
More than fifty years after Manne’s initial work on the subject, the right
to sell continues to be influential with respect to the assessment of corporate
governance rules. Scholars who view markets as the primary regulator of
corporate governance “focus on exit as a kind of first among equals” with
respect to the various options (Exit, Voice, and Loyalty) that Albert
Hirschman described for influencing an organization. 39 The argument that
shareholders can protect themselves from managerial misconduct by exiting
offers a powerful reason for limiting corporate governance regulation.
III. Two Limits of the Right to Sell
Over the years, the right to sell has had varying degrees of success as an
argument to resist federal regulation of the public corporation. The world
has changed since the time of Manne and Winter. Corporations have grown
larger and more complex. Technology has created ventures that can be
extremely profitable for investors but are difficult to value. The creation of
wealth has provided more opportunities for managers to divert gains for
themselves. As a result, investors must place more and more trust in the
integrity of management and the systems they have put in place to monitor
risk.
In part because of the complexity of this new world, the severity of
corporate governance scandals has increased, highlighting the limits of the
right to sell in protecting shareholders. This Part III argues that two of these
limitations explain increasing federal intervention with respect to the public
corporation. First, the right to sell can be ineffective when bad corporate
governance results in a rapid and substantial decline in corporate value.
39. Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance,
73 CAL. L. REV. 1671, 1673 (1985).
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Shareholders may not have time to pressure management to change or sell
to protect themselves in such circumstances. Second, some corporate
governance issues may be difficult to directly link to the economic
performance of the firm. Even if shareholders prefer a particular
governance measure, if it does not have a direct impact on the stock price,
shareholders will not have an economic incentive to sell their shares. The
recent efforts to federalize corporate law might be understood as addressing
these two limitations to the right to sell.40
A. Corporate Failures
1. Mismanagement and Precipitous Shareholder Losses
The right to sell’s effectiveness depends in part on whether shareholders
have time to exercise the right. One obvious drawback of the right to sell is
that selling shareholders will necessarily take a loss. As Manne
acknowledged, “sales by dissatisfied shareholders are necessary to trigger
the mechanism and . . . these shareholders may suffer considerable
losses.” 41 According to Manne, the right to sell operates after these initial
losses in preventing “even greater capital losses,” 42 presumably by either
pressuring management to change or by selling to a new control group that
will implement new management and policies.
The right to sell should work best in situations where a particular
governance policy has a clear but modest impact on the company’s
performance. Over time, shareholders who are unhappy with the stock price
will gradually exit from the company. Such shareholders can take a
manageable loss and move on to another investment. This basic pattern
does not apply to the modern corporate crisis where public companies of
substantial size have quickly collapsed, arguably because of poor corporate
governance, leaving shareholders with little time to exercise the right to
sell.
To be fair, the proponents of the right to sell do not view it as a panacea
in preventing serious losses. Manne noted that in certain circumstances,
40. There are, of course, other limitations, such as the ability of managers to entrench
themselves so they do not have to respond to the market for corporate control.
41. Manne, Mergers and the Market, supra note 16, at 113; see also Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1443
(1989) (noting that shareholders in company with an unfavorable change in governance “can
sell, but they can’t avoid the loss”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1550 (1989) (“The seller of shares bears the
consequences of agency costs through a lower sale price.”).
42. Manne, Mergers and the Market, supra note 16, at 113.
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selling by shareholders may “imply that the corporation will not survive.” 43
Manne also acknowledged that “corporation law must still provide some
device for recovering damages from dishonest, disloyal or grossly negligent
managers,” though he criticized the derivative suit as ineffective relative to
the right to sell.44 Nevertheless, Manne may not have anticipated the events
that in more recent years have resulted in questions concerning the
effectiveness of the right to sell.
Corporate governance scholars have long observed that shareholders are
best able to protect themselves from poor management when it is
observable prior to their investment in the firm. Lucian Bebchuk, for
example, in discussing the issue of whether corporate law should be
mandatory or enabling, distinguishes between governance provisions that
are set forth in the initial corporate charter and those that are adopted
midstream by managers. 45 While shareholders can price the likely effect of
poor governance before they enter an investment, they are vulnerable when
there is an unexpected governance change after they have invested.
A distinction might also be drawn between situations where midstream
conduct causes modest harm and where midstream conduct causes
significant harm. In cases of modest harm, shareholders can react by selling
their shares, putting pressure on the company to make a change. In cases of
significant harm, the damage may be so substantial that the company is
unable to recover. Even if shareholders sell their shares, the damage has
already been done and may not be reversible.
The distinction between modest and significant declines in value depends
on the assumption that the market is not completely efficient in assessing
the fundamental value of the company. If the market were that efficient,
shareholders would be compensated for the risk of a precipitous decline.
The initial price they paid for the stock would have been appropriately
discounted to take into account the possibility of a complete loss.
There is reason to believe, though, that it is difficult to adequately
compensate investors for taking on the risk of a sudden collapse. Consider a
case where there is a 50% chance that a firm is worth $90, and a 50%
chance the firm is worth $10. One view might be that the correct stock price
should be $50. An investor who pays that amount is arguably compensated
for the risk of loss. On the other hand, because of the wide variance in
possible outcomes, there is an argument that $50 would not be a meaningful
43. Manne, The Modern Corporation, supra note 14, at 410.
44. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems, supra note 2, at 272.
45. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989).
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price. As finance professor and valuation expert Aswath Damodaran
observes:
In general . . . best-case/worst-case analyses are not very
informative. After all, there should be no surprise in knowing
that an asset will be worth a lot in the best case and not very
much in the worst case. Thus, an equity research analyst who
uses this approach to value a stock priced at $50 may arrive at
values of $80 for the best case and $10 for the worst case; with a
range that large, it will be difficult to make a judgment on
whether the stock is a good investment. 46
When risk is uncertain, there is a danger of substantial mispricing.
Consider a scenario where the market believes there is a 0% chance of a
complete collapse for a $100 stock, but the true risk is 10%. Under that
scenario, the stock should be priced at $90. The shareholder who purchases
the stock for $100 would overpay by $10.
Even if a market is efficient, the risk of loss may not stay constant. The
initial price the shareholder paid for the stock becomes less relevant when a
shareholder holds the stock for a significant length of time. A shareholder
may purchase at a time when there was no risk that a stock would go to $1,
but several years later, the risk of such a loss suddenly increases to 80%.
One might argue that the price the shareholder paid reflected the risk that
years later the risk of loss would increase, but it is unlikely that the market
will always be able to meaningfully assess the probability of events years in
the future.
The right to sell thus assumes that investors are able to adequately assess
the risk of a catastrophic governance failure. Because it can be difficult to
evaluate such risk, the right to sell will not always protect investors from
midstream conduct that results in significant value destruction.
2. Federal Intervention
Though there have always been questionable public companies that
collapse in the wake of poor decisions, there are now more examples of
companies that were thought to be stable companies of significant value but
have quickly failed, arguably because of systematic corporate governance
failure. These cases illustrate the limits of the right to sell and were the

46. ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS
DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ANY ASSET 895 (3d ed. 2012).
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main impetus for the passage of federal corporate law that seeks to protect
shareholders of significant public companies from substantial loss.
Three of the most startling examples of failed public companies are
Enron, WorldCom, and Lehman Brothers. Enron was an energy company
with the seventh-highest market capitalization in the United States and a
triple-A credit rating. It issued a substantial earnings restatement in October
2001, issued a multi-year restatement in November 2001, and then filed for
bankruptcy less than a month later.47 WorldCom was a telecommunications
company. In June 2002, it reported that it had understated its expenses by
$3.852 billion and restated its earnings.48 It filed for bankruptcy less than a
month later. Lehman Brothers was an investment bank with a market
capitalization of over $30 billion in January 2008.49 Less than eight months
later, it filed for bankruptcy protection after its market capitalization
declined by nearly 95%.
External events likely played a major role in the decline of these
companies. Both the Enron and WorldCom crises occurred in the wake of
the collapse of the first internet bubble. 50 Investors became less willing to
invest in companies with speculative businesses. The market for
telecommunications services declined, making it difficult for WorldCom to
maintain its earnings. Lehman Brothers collapsed in the wake of the
financial crisis of 2008, as investors began questioning the value of
mortgage-related assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions.
All three of these failures were also arguably caused by poor corporate
governance. Enron failed to manage transactions with special purpose
entities that resulted in significant conflicts of interest. 51 WorldCom failed
to prevent significant accounting fraud.52 Lehman Brothers failed to

47. Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 287, 288
(2003).
48. DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. 2 (Mar. 31,
2003).
49. Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 2, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.,
526 B.R. 481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Nos. 08–13555 (SCC), 08–01420 (SCC)).
50. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND
ITS UNDOING (2004).
51. For a report on some of these transactions, see First Interim Report of Neal Batson,
Court-Appointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23,
2003).
52. For a concise description of the fraud, see First Amended Complaint, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. WorldCom, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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manage the risk of its balance sheet. 53 Executives at both Enron and
WorldCom were convicted of criminal securities fraud.54 The board
members of WorldCom were required to personally contribute to
settlements of civil actions arising from the fraud. 55
The failure of these companies and the resulting shareholder losses
illustrate the limits of the right to sell. Investors suffered billions of dollars
in permanent losses from investments in what were established public
companies. Many investors had no meaningful opportunity to sell, and even
if they had, the pressure caused by their sales was too late to effectuate
meaningful governance change. These events lead some investors to
question their approach to corporate governance problems. As a 2010
policy paper by TIAA-CREFF analyzing the “Crises of the Last Decade”
noted, investors can no longer rely on their right to sell for protection but
instead “should be vigilant in trying to prevent problems before value is lost
and it is too late to sell . . . .” 56
The governmental response to these monumental governance failures
was significant federal intervention. Rather than leave the protection of
shareholders to the states, Congress passed two major Acts that have helped
shape the governance of large public companies. The first, the SarbanesOxley Act, 57 addressed the problem of unexpected company failures by
strengthening internal control requirements and requiring board audit
committees to be independent.58 As described by a congressional report,
Sarbanes-Oxley was prompted by “recent corporate failures” and included
measures to “improve investor protection in connection with the operation
53. See Valukas, supra note 49.
54. See Alexei Barrionuevo, Enron Chiefs Guilty of Fraud and Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES
(May 25, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/business/25cnd-enron.html; Ken Belson,
Ex-Chief of WorldCom Is Found Guilty in $11 Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/16/business/exchief-of-worldcom-is-found-guilty-in-11-bill
ion-fraud.html.
55. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, 10 Ex-Directors from WorldCom to Pay Millions,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/06/business/10-exdirectorsfrom-worldcom-to-pay-millions.html.
56. TIAA-CREFF INST., POLICY BRIEF: RESPONSIBLE INVESTING AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: LESSONS LEARNED FOR SHAREHOLDERS FROM THE CRISES OF THE LAST
DECADE 1-3 (Mar. 2010), https://www.tiaadirect.com/public/pdf/institute/pdf/pb_responsi
bleinvesting0310a.pdf.
57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.).
58. Id. § 404. Sarbanes-Oxley contains a number of other corporate governance
provisions such a ban on personal loans to corporate executives, id. § 402, and provisions
relating to the independence of auditors, id. §§ 201-209.
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of public companies.” 59 The second, the Dodd-Frank Act, 60 addressed the
problem of systemic risk that resulted in the sudden failure of financial
institutions. Congress explained that Dodd-Frank was meant to form “a new
framework to prevent a recurrence or mitigate the impact of financial crises
that could cripple financial markets and damage the economy.” 61
Sarbanes-Oxley was meant to help ensure the integrity of a company’s
financial statements. In doing so, Sarbanes-Oxley not only protects
investors who are purchasing the company’s stock, but also the
shareholders who continue to hold the stock. A House Report noted this
concern when acknowledging the losses incurred by Enron shareholders
who were unable to sell their shares while the company collapsed. 62 By
helping reduce material deficiencies in a company’s financial statements,
internal controls provide shareholders with protection from surprise losses
that can quickly destroy value. By requiring independent audit committees
for listed public companies, Sarbanes-Oxley sought to create a structure
where the board can better supervise the audit process. In effect, SarbanesOxley rejects the view that the right to sell will largely protect shareholders
from significant losses.
While Sarbanes-Oxley addressed the governance problem of accounting
fraud, Dodd-Frank responded to a somewhat different problem: the failure
of financial institutions to manage risk. For example, under the Volcker
Rule, certain financial institutions are limited in their proprietary trading
and investments in private equity and hedge funds. 63 This regulation is
based on the premise that some types of trading risk are too difficult for
shareholders to effectively monitor. The Dodd-Frank Act thus attempts to
protect shareholders by reducing such risk.
Both Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank are controversial for the costs
they impose on public companies. Whether or not these Acts are efficient
ways to protect shareholders is a topic that is best left for another day.
Indeed, an argument could be made that the failure of the right to sell
should not lead to the conclusion that private ordering should be
abandoned. Another right, the right of shareholders to diversify, would be

59. S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 23 (2002).
60. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
61. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2 (2010).
62. H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 18 (2002).
63. Dodd-Frank Act § 619.
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sufficient to protect investors from substantial losses. 64 For this Article, the
important point is that both Acts can be linked to the perception that
investors need protection beyond the right to sell.
It is telling that in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals,
Delaware, the leading state corporate law maker, made efforts to protect
investors from systemic corporate governance failure. In the 2006 case
Stone v. Ritter, 65 the Delaware Supreme Court held that a board has a duty
to monitor the corporation for wrongdoing. 66 This duty to monitor was
narrowly defined. The board can only be liable if it “consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.” 67 This narrow duty,
however, still permitted the Delaware Chancery Court to find that two AIG
board directors failed to adequately monitor the company for financial
wrongdoing. 68 Such efforts might have been motivated by the concern that
the inability of Delaware to prevent massive corporate governance failures
could result in increasing federal intervention with respect to corporate
governance. 69
Other states also reacted to protect investors from sudden value
destruction. The California Supreme Court created a right of action for
holders of stock to sue for securities fraud in Small v. Fritz Companies. 70
Because federal law only permits purchasers and sellers of stock to bring
suit, 71 such state causes of action provide additional protection to
shareholders who are unable to sell to avoid significant losses. The
California Supreme Court was prompted to create such a cause of action
64. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities
Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 641 (1985).
65. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
66. Id. at 370. This duty was introduced in an earlier decision by Chancellor Allen. See
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). The duty to monitor
was rooted in the board’s duty of good faith, which for a time was seen as a standalone duty.
See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004).
However, Stone v. Ritter clarified that good faith was derivative of the duty of loyalty and
not an independent duty. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
67. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
68. In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763, 799 (Del. Ch. 2009). In other cases,
however, the Delaware Chancery did not find a breach of the duty. See, e.g., In re Citigroup
Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
69. One might question whether these efforts were lasting changes or merely efforts to
deflect criticism in the wake of Enron. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business
Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005).
70. 65 P.3d 1255 (Cal. 2003).
71. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975).
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because of the wave of fraud that resulted in the collapse of Enron and
WorldCom. It explained:
The last few years have seen repeated reports of false financial
statements and accounting fraud, demonstrating that many
charges of corporate fraud were neither speculative nor attempts
to extort settlement money, but were based on actual
misconduct. “To open the newspaper today is to receive a daily
dose of scandal, from Adelphia to Enron and beyond. Sadly,
each of us knows that these newly publicized instances of
accounting-related securities fraud are no longer out of the
ordinary, save perhaps in scale alone.” The victims of the
reported frauds, moreover, are often persons who were induced
to hold corporate stock by rosy but false financial reports, while
others who knew the true state of affairs exercised stock options
and sold at inflated prices.72
For a time, there was a surge of class actions filed in state court asserting
fraud brought pursuant to this holder theory. Though the U.S. Supreme
Court later found that such holder cases were preempted by federal law if
brought as a class action, 73 the creation of the right reflects the concern of
protecting shareholders from misconduct.
Despite the efforts of Delaware and other states to create duties
protecting shareholders from sudden value destruction, it is likely that
federal law will be more influential in regulating public corporations.
Federal internal controls and corporate governance requirements apply to
most of the largest public corporations. Any financial institution will need
to comply with the extensive mandates of Dodd-Frank. In contrast,
Delaware sets a minimal floor that only requires the existence of a
monitoring system.
Thus, there is a connection between one of the limits of the right to sell,
that it does not protect against substantial failures of corporate governance,
and the rise of federal corporate law. The most prominent federal

72. Small, 65 P.3d at 1263-64 (quoting STEVEN G. SCHULMAN ET AL., COMM. ON
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR ASS’N, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT: THE IMPACT ON
CIVIL LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS FROM THE PLAINTIFFS' PERSPECTIVE
1 (2002)).
73. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 84-85 (2006).
For an argument that such holder claims should not be preempted, see Amanda M. Rose,
Life After SLUSA: What Is the Fate of Holding Claims?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 455 (2002).
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interventions directly address the problem that shareholders cannot always
react quickly enough to stop corporate wrongdoing.
B. Materiality and Corporate Governance
The right to sell is also limited in that it is only triggered with respect to
corporate governance provisions and practices that are obviously material
to the firm’s economic performance. 74 There may be governance that the
shareholders are unhappy with, but if it has a minor impact on the firm’s
value, shareholders may not be willing to sell what could be a profitable
investment.
1. The Difficulty of Valuing Governance
The value of good corporate governance is difficult to measure. An
electronics company with strong checks on management may nevertheless
perform poorly because consumer tastes change and demand for the
company’s product declines. In contrast, an energy company with little
protection for shareholders may perform well because the market price of
oil is strong. Even if there is an argument that the energy company could
perform better with strong governance, it will be difficult for shareholders
to prove that such measures would have such a result, and little pressure for
management to adopt such measures if they choose not to.
Corporate governance matters most in particular circumstances that not
all companies will face. For example, if managers want to make a decision
that is likely to result in the destruction of value, an effective board could
challenge the managers so that they do not make the wrong choice. But how
often will a company find itself in that particular situation? It might be rare
for such decisions to arise, making the value of a good board difficult to
assess.
Another reason investors may not see governance as material is that as a
company grows larger, it is difficult for any one particular governance issue
to affect more than a small percentage of the company’s market value.
Shareholders might disagree with individual polices, but it may be unclear
whether each individual policy will have more than a nominal impact on the
company’s value. As Lucian Bebchuk and Ehud Kamar show, companies
may bundle questionable governance measures with actions shareholders
agree with, making it difficult for shareholders to oppose the entire

74. For purposes of assessing legal liability, a “fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important” with respect to a
decision. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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bundle. 75 A shareholder is unlikely to sell for the sole reason that he
disagrees with one particular governance practice.76
Furthermore, the right to sell may not be particularly effective with
respect to issues where shareholders’ preferences substantially vary. Some
shareholders may care about ethical issues, such as whether the company
sells diamonds from questionable sources,77 while other shareholders who
are focused on the economic performance of the firm will not. Even if a
shareholder sells, it is unlikely that such sales will affect the market price
for the shares. The right to sell thus would not be effective in pushing
through change that does not fit the interests of the traditional profitmaximizing shareholder.
Thus, the literature has yet to conclusively establish a link between
particular corporate governance provisions and shareholder wealth. A study
by Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black failed to find evidence that companies
with more independent directors on their boards perform better than
companies with fewer independent directors. 78 This finding cuts against the
intuition that such boards are more likely to discipline poor managers. On
the other hand, there is evidence that a staggered board, which makes it
more difficult for a company to change control, is negatively associated
with a firm’s market value. 79 On balance, it is fair to say that “the empirical
literature investigating the effect of individual corporate governance

75. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Ehud Kamar, Bundling and Entrenchment, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1549 (2010) (studying proposals for staggered boards bundled with a merger).
76. For example, institutional investors may have an investment strategy that makes it
difficult for them to exit. See, e.g., Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant
Activists, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 140 (noting that exit is not feasible for
investors using a passive investment strategy); Robert Profusek, The Increasing Power of
Institutional Investors, WALL ST. J.: THE EXPERTS (June 24, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://blogs.
wsj.com/experts/2015/06/24/the-increasing-power-of-institutional-investors/ (noting that
because of the increasing size of investments, “major institutional investors have become the
equity markets and cannot just vote with their feet when a company in which they are
invested underperforms or misallocates capital—that is to say, the ‘Wall Street Rule’ is
dead”).
77. Congress through the passage of Dodd-Frank required the SEC to pass rules relating
to the disclosure of the use of conflict minerals. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act § 1502, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213-18 (2010).
78. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002).
79. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN.
ECON. 409 (2005); but see K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value
of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016).
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mechanisms on corporate performance has not been able to identify
systematically positive effects and is, at best, inconclusive.” 80
Studies have, however, found that groups of corporate governance
provisions appear to be correlated with firm performance. Paul Gompers,
Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick constructed an index based on twenty-four
governance rules, and found that firms with the strongest shareholder rights
earned abnormal returns of 8.5% per year relative to the firms with the
weakest shareholder rights. 81 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen
Ferrell constructed a narrower index with six governance provisions
relevant to the entrenchment of a board, and found that firms with higher
entrenchment had lower valuations.82
Though they are suggestive, these studies do not establish a strong case
that particular governance provisions are material to investors.83 If good
governance is associated with groups of factors, it is unlikely that investors
will put pressure on management by selling their shares if one or two
desirable governance provisions are not present. Moreover, these studies
are by their nature retrospective—looking at the past performance of firms
over many years. They do not establish that present-day investors will react
to the presence or absence of these factors, though perhaps these results
may encourage investors to examine governance indices going forward in
deciding whether to sell. 84 Although there have been efforts to construct
indices that can guide investment decisions, it is unclear whether investors
are actually using these indices to decide whether to exit an investment.
There is an intuition that good governance is better for corporations, but
it is far from certain whether it affects investor decisions. Absent clear
breakdowns in corporate culture, investors are unlikely to put pressure on
managers by actively selling their shares. Thus, while the right to sell might

80. Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1814 (2008).
81. See Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003).
82. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 783 (2009).
83. There have been some studies that have questioned the link between these
governance indices and firm performance. See Bhagat et al., supra note 80, at 1827-32.
Moreover, evidence of a correlation does not establish causation. See Yair Listokin,
Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Effect of Corporate Governance, 10 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 90 (2008).
84. Indeed, there is now a significant industry that produces governance indices for
investors. See Bhagat et al., supra note 80, at 1807.
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provide a check against what is clearly bad governance, it is unlikely that
the right to sell is always effective in encouraging firms to reform.
2. The Example of Executive Compensation
When the right to sell does not induce companies to adopt particular
governance provisions, reformers have pushed for federal intervention to
mandate corporate governance standards. This dynamic is illustrated by
federal efforts to regulate executive compensation in public companies.
One of the most controversial issues of corporate governance relates to
the compensation paid to high-level corporate managers. 85 One allegation is
that executives manipulate boards so that they are paid richly, even when
their performance does not warrant high compensation.86 Because
executives often influence who sits on the board of directors, and many
board members themselves are executives at other companies, there seems
to be a corrupt system where insiders benefit themselves at the expense of
shareholders. Though the rise in executive compensation is arguably linked
to the growth in the size of public companies,87 there is an argument that
there are abuses in the way executive compensation is awarded.
The right to sell does not put meaningful pressure on companies to
change executive compensation policies. While payments can be substantial
to an individual, they are usually an immaterial fraction of the company’s
value. 88 Absent a clear link to company performance, even shareholders
85. The issue has attracted the attention of the popular press. See, e.g., David Owen, The
Pay Problem: What’s to Be Done About C.E.O. Compensation, NEW YORKER (Oct. 12,
2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/12/the-pay-problem. For a brief
history of the issue, see Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the
Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 846, 857-64 (2011).
86. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004); Charles
M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation – A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937,
947-48 (1993).
87. See, e.g., Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So
Much?, 123 Q.J. ECON. 49 (2008) (presenting evidence of correlation between increase in
CEO pay and growth in market capitalizations of public companies).
88. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Twenty Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom: An
Essay on the Limits of Civil Liability of Corporate Directors and the Role of Shareholder
Inspection Rights, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 283, 290 (2006) (noting that “the area of executive
compensation is one in which the materiality threshold is rarely reached”); Bevis Longstreth,
A Real World Critique of Pay Without Performance, 30 J. CORP. L. 767, 771 (2005) (noting
that the issue of executive compensation “lacks materiality and, therefore, deserves far less
attention than it gets”); see also BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 86, at 55-57 (discussing why
markets do not check excessive executive compensation).
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who object to the size of such compensation may still not sell their shares.
Thus, there will be little pressure on boards from selling shareholders to
reform their practices. The persistence of high executive compensation is an
indication that the market is unable to resolve the issue.
As the problem of executive compensation remained unsolved, reformers
turned to federal legislation. 89 While executive compensation has long been
subject to disclosure under the federal securities laws, recent disclosure
rules are more aggressive in attempting to pressure companies to reduce
executive pay. For example, Dodd-Frank requires disclosure of the ratio
between the CEO’s compensation and the typical worker of the company, 90
as well as the relationship between executive compensation and the
company’s performance. 91 Moreover, following the example of
independent audit committees set forth by Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank
requires all members of the compensation committees of a listed public
company to be independent. 92 By separating the committee that approves
compensation from management, the hope is that the board will negotiate
more aggressively with management. Rather than allow shareholders to
protect themselves, federal standards attempt to create boards that act to
protect shareholders from executive compensation abuses.
Because shareholder exit has not been an effective way of regulating
executive compensation, Congress has attempted to reinvigorate
shareholder voice on the issue. 93 The Say-on-Pay Reforms thus require
public companies to periodically have a shareholder vote on the company’s
executive compensation practices.94 The results of such votes are
nonbinding, but a negative vote could serve as an impetus for changing a
89. State efforts to regulate executive compensation through corporate law have been
minimal. Though the Disney derivative litigation, In re Walt Disney Derivative Litigation,
907 A.2d 693 (2005), brought attention to the issue, the case set a high bar for finding a
board liable for approving an excessive compensation package.
90. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 953(b), Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903-04 (2010); see also Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg.
50,104 (Aug. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249).
91. Dodd-Frank Act § 953(a).
92. Dodd-Frank Act § 952(a).
93. Moreover, shareholders have their own incentive to exercise voice when they are
unable to exercise the right to sell. Sophia Grene, SRI: Ethics Beyond the Wall Street Walk,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/a032abf0-86b0-11e4-9c2d00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e3 (“Company boards are starting to accept that they have to engage
with shareholders, particularly asset managers. With the rise of passive managers, who do
not have the option of selling shares with which they are unhappy, engagement is likely to
grow.”).
94. Dodd-Frank Act § 951.
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company’s compensation policy. According to the legislative history, the
hope is that such “votes on pay would serve as a direct referendum on the
decisions of the compensation committee and would offer a more targeted
way to signal shareowner discontent than withholding votes from
committee members.” 95 Put another way, requiring such votes arguably
allows shareholders to express displeasure with executive compensation
payments without more drastic measures such as selling their shares. A fact
that may not be material to the investor’s decision to sell may be material
with respect to the investor’s decision to vote. It is telling that Congress has
tried to remedy the failure of the right to exit to solve the problem by
mandating a right to voice.
IV. Assessing the Rise of Federal Corporate Law
Part III argued as a descriptive matter that aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley
and Dodd-Frank reforms can be understood as addressing limits of the right
to sell. This Part IV takes up the normative question of whether this federal
response is warranted. It concludes that there is a stronger case for federal
intervention with respect to protecting shareholders from precipitous
declines in value than for intervening to correct governance issues that are
not economically material to shareholders.
A. A Test for Evaluating Federal Corporate Law
The increasing federal intervention with respect to the governance of
public corporations has blurred the distinction between corporate and
securities law. These reforms have been implemented through amendments
to the federal securities laws, increasing the regulation of what was once the
domain of the states. 96 Though many of these provisions have elements of
securities law in that they relate to disclosure, there is a sense that they do
more than create securities law.
In a prior article, 97 I argued that corporate and securities law can be
distinguished based on the type of protection they provide to investors.
Securities law protects investors while they are trading; corporate law
protects investors while they are owners of shares. As a trader, an investor
is vulnerable to buying or selling at a distorted price. As an owner, an

95. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 134 (2010).
96. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977) (observing
that the states “traditionally” have regulated a “wide variety of corporate conduct” and that
“extension of the federal securities laws” may “interfere with state corporate law”).
97. Park, supra note 9.
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investor is vulnerable to corporate misconduct that destroys the value of his
shares.
Judged by this standard, significant aspects of both Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank are effectively federal corporate law. These efforts were
prompted by failures of significant public companies, where the regulatory
regime, both state and federal, seemed ineffective in preventing massive
harm to shareholders. Internal controls are partly motivated by the desire to
protect shareholders from precipitous destruction of value. Executive
compensation reform is motivated by the argument that shareholders need
protection from executives who manipulate the compensation process to
capture value for themselves. Though they are formally part of the
securities laws, these interventions are better thought of as a type of
corporate law.
In my prior project, I argued that because corporate and securities law
protect different types of interests, there is an argument that they should
differ in their regulatory approaches.98 Because all trading investors have a
strong interest in valuation, securities law is both uniform and mandatory.
In contrast, it is more difficult to identify uniform interests for shareholderowners. Some shareholders have a short-term horizon and prefer to defer
less to managers, while other shareholders have a long-term horizon and are
more willing to defer to managers. There is thus a stronger case that
corporate law should be diverse and enabling.
Though there is good reason to distinguish between federal securities law
and state corporate law, there will be situations where it may be appropriate
to create federal law to protect ownership interests. Regulators should be
most wary of the possibility that a federal intervention will unduly favor
one set of shareholders over others. Thus, when making federal corporate
law, there are two considerations to keep in mind.99 The first is whether
there is a compelling case that the policy would benefit shareholders. The
second is whether the policy might favor some groups of shareholders over
others.
B. Efforts to Protect Investors from Corporate Failures
Viewed in light of this framework, there is a case that efforts to protect
investors from sudden corporate failure are warranted. For one thing, there
is an argument that such reforms, which include Sarbanes-Oxley’s internal
controls, are a hybrid of securities and corporate law. Internal controls and

98. Id. at 119.
99. See id. at 180 (describing test to assess federal corporate law).
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independent audit committees benefit not only shareholder-owners, but also
purchasing investors who rely on the integrity of company financial
statements in trusting market valuations. They are thus consistent with the
traditional role of federal securities law in protecting the integrity of
markets. To the extent that internal controls are primarily directed at large
public companies, there is a national interest in the soundness of such
companies.
There is a case that some level of internal control regulation offers
benefits for shareholders. While internal controls are costly, such costs are
modest for large public companies. To the extent that they improve the
reliability of financial statements, internal controls will provide assurance to
shareholders that there is a lower risk of wrongdoing by management that
will reduce the value of their shares. Internal controls offer additional
protection to shareholders who are unable to identify significant problems
before it is too late to sell without incurring a substantial loss. It is difficult,
if not impossible, to identify precisely what level of internal controls is
appropriate, but there is an argument that efforts to improve the accuracy of
financial reporting can help remedy the inability of shareholders to protect
themselves through the right to sell.
A significant objection to internal control regulation is that shareholders
will likely disagree about the appropriate extent of internal controls. Some
investors may be satisfied with a minimal level of protection, while others
may want more. Mandating a uniform rule with respect to internal controls
may favor those investors who are risk-averse over investors who are more
willing to take on risk.
One solution to this objection could be to limit internal control
requirements to larger companies that tend to be attractive investments for
investors who are relatively risk-averse. Indeed, the regulatory consensus
has been that the most stringent rules should be reserved for larger,
established public companies that are able to afford the cost.100 Smaller
companies are exempt until they grow to a size where there is a greater
expectation that financial controls will be effective.101 To the extent that
investors want to take on substantial risk, they can do so by investing in
smaller companies.
100. Moreover, some of the costs of internal controls for larger public companies are
offset by benefits that are exclusive to larger companies, such as easier access to the capital
markets. See James J. Park, Two Trends in the Regulation of the Public Corporation, 7 OHIO
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 429 (2012).
101. See, e.g., Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 103, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 15
U.S.C. § 7262 (2012).
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Another way of addressing the concerns associated with a mandatory
rule is to allow companies some flexibility in how they may comply with it.
For example, the regulations governing the reliability of internal controls
appear to be principles-based rather than rules-based. The ambiguity of
these provisions allows companies to balance different shareholder
interests. Initially, there was significant concern about the meaning of the
internal control requirements, perhaps making public companies
overcautious in their compliance, but over time, companies have become
more comfortable with the regime. There have not been aggressive
enforcement actions directed at ex ante compliance with the internal control
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley that would prompt public companies to apply
the mandate in a uniform way. Different companies have room to comply in
different ways, allowing for some regulatory diversity.
C. Efforts to Regulate Corporate Governance
In contrast, the case for federal intervention to address the second limit
on the right to sell is weaker. The fact that certain governance policies are
immaterial to investors indicates that investors themselves do not believe
that reform would benefit them. The fact that investors are not selling could
indicate substantial disagreement about which governance rules are
optimal.
On the other hand, it may be that shareholders need some protection
from policies that are difficult to trace to value destruction. It is telling that
some of the more extensive executive compensation measures were passed
in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008-2009. One justification for DoddFrank’s regulation of executive compensation was the belief that problems
in the design of such compensation contributed to excessive risk-taking that
destroyed shareholder value. 102 There is a strong argument, though, that the
problematic compensation policies of the financial firms that failed during
the crisis were specific to the investment banking industry.
There will likely be substantial shareholder disagreement with respect to
corporate governance reform. Although virtually all shareholders would
agree that value destruction is a bad thing, it is unlikely that all or even
most shareholders will believe that addressing immaterial corporate
governance issues is a priority. The danger of some proposals to increase
mandatory governance regulation is that they will advance the interests of
some shareholders over others. Congress and the SEC should exercise

102. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 35 (2010) (asserting that “executive compensation
practices that promoted excessive risk-taking” contributed to the financial crisis).
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caution in promulgating federal governance standards because of the
difficulty of linking such standards to the one unifying concern of
shareholders, the value of their shares.
As governance interventions increase, the danger is that they will
snowball, affecting areas that are more and more tangential to the common
interests of shareholders. The precedent of executive compensation
regulation, while only somewhat controversial, could lead to other
regulatory reforms that are more questionable. For example, after the
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elections
Commission, 103 there have been efforts to require public companies to
disclose political spending pursuant to the securities laws. There are
indications that some investors are interested in knowing more about the
political spending of corporations, 104 but it is far from clear that there is a
consensus by shareholders on the issue. It is likely that political spending is
fairly minimal in amount, and would be immaterial to shareholders.105 The
issue has resulted in an unfortunate politicization of the issue, where
Senators rather than shareholders appear to be pushing for reforms that
have unclear economic benefits for shareholders.106
Rather than mandatory federal intervention, a preferable approach might
be to provide avenues for shareholders to express their preferences with
respect to particular governance policies. Put another way, thoughtful ways
of allowing shareholders to exercise voice can be an appropriate response
when the right to sell is ineffective. The Say-on-Pay law might be an
example of such intervention. There are some indications that the law,
which requires nonbinding votes, has increased dialogue with shareholders
without leading to routine second-guessing of executive pay packages. 107
Another example relates to the question of whether shareholders should
have access to the company’s proxy statement so they can nominate their
own director candidates to the board. In the wake of the D.C. Circuit’s
103. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
104. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate
Political Spending, 101 GEO. L.J. 923, 937-41 (2013).
105. See Michael D. Guttentag, On Requiring Public Companies to Disclose Political
Spending, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 593 (2014).
106. See Elizabeth Dexheimer, SEC’s White Attacked by Democrats over Political
Spending Stance, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 14, 2016), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/sec-swhite-attacked-by-democrats-over-political-spending-stance-27470.html.
107. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will It Lead to a
Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 124962 (2012) (reporting high approval rates with respect to executive compensation along with
greater shareholder dialogue).
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decision to strike down federal rules relating to proxy access, 108 the SEC
enacted a rule that allows shareholders to propose that the company
implement rules allowing for such access. 109 To the extent that the right to
sell is deficient in pressuring for change, opening up avenues for
shareholders to express their preferences through the right to vote might be
warranted.
V. Conclusion
More than fifty years later, Henry Manne’s work on the role of markets
in regulating corporate governance continues to be influential. Manne offers
a sensible response to the problem of the separation of ownership and
control identified by Berle and Means. Rather than relying solely on law,
investors rely on the discipline of the market to protect themselves from
poor management. This argument has been utilized in a number of contexts
to argue for less rather than more corporate governance regulation.
The power of the right to sell has been a reason to maintain a system of
regulatory federalism with respect to large public corporations. Limited
mandatory rules through federal securities law protect trading investors,
while the protection of the diverse interests of shareholder-owners is
delegated to the enabling rules of the states, primarily Delaware. To some
extent, investors should be expected to take care of themselves when they
are unhappy with a company’s governance.
This system has come under pressure in recent years, primarily because
of the limits of the right to sell. The right to sell works best when
shareholders are able to identify a clear problem and have time to express
their displeasure with management by exiting the firm through selling. The
sudden collapse of a number of prominent public companies and the
persistence of governance problems (such as executive compensation)
highlight the limits of the market’s ability to regulate the public
corporation. Much of the federal corporate law enacted over the last fifteen
years was motivated by the desire to remedy market failures. The process
described by Manne and other law and economics scholars simply has not
108. Section 971 of Dodd-Frank authorized the SEC to pass a rule allowing for proxy
access. Pursuant to that provision, the SEC passed Rule 14a-11, which required proxy
access. This rule was challenged, and the D.C. Circuit held that the SEC “acted arbitrarily
and capriciously” by failing to “adequately assess the economic effects” of the rule. Business
Roundtable v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
109. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No.
9259, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29384, 76
Fed. Reg. 58100 (Sept. 20, 2011).
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been sufficient to protect shareholders from the effects of corporate
mismanagement.
When attempting to protect the ownership interest of investors, the
concern is that regulation unduly favors one set of shareholders over others.
Thus, regulators should be cautious in making federal corporate law. To the
extent that certain governance problems raise national concerns, and benefit
the vast majority of shareholders, some federal intervention is justified. The
protection of investors through internal controls arguably meets these
criteria.
At the same time, not every governance issue should be the subject of
federal concern. The lack of shareholder interest in pressuring managers
over certain practices cannot be completely ignored when assessing
corporate governance policy. At the very least, when the market views an
issue as immaterial, there is likely shareholder disagreement as to whether
intervention would be beneficial. When shareholders do not exercise the
right to sell, it may mean that they view governance through a different lens
than reformers who seek to change the prevailing practice.
Ultimately, the case for mandatory corporate rules rests on the
assumption that investors cannot protect themselves. History has shown that
there are situations in which markets do not prevent corporate misconduct.
The federal securities laws can be a source of protection when markets fail,
but only when it is clear that intervention would be beneficial.
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